79otwila Argument
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
X
WILHELMSEN PREMIER MARINE
FULES AS,
Plaintiff,
07 CV 5700 (CM)
v. 07 CV 5798 (CM)
LIDC DDOVEDODEC DTV I TD
UBS PROVEDORES PTY LTD,
Defendant.
Defendant.
x
New York, N.Y.
September 24, 2007
10:00 a.m.
10.00 u.m.
Before:
2433.01
HON. COLLEEN MCMAHON,
District Judge
Ç
APPEARANCES
HOLLAND & KNIGHT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
BY: MICHAEL J. FREVOLA
WILLIAM HONAN
KERI ANN KILCOMMONS
BETANCOURT, VAN HEMMEN, GRECO & KENYON
Attorneys for Defendant
BY: JEANNE-MARIE D. VAN HEMMEN

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79otwila Argument THE COURT: Good morning, good morning. 1 2 Can somebody point me wherever in this record I will find the contract, not invoices, the contract between the 3 4 plaintiff and the defendants? I can't find it. 5 MS. VAN HEMMEN: Your Honor, I have the document that 6 will help pointing to this in finding that. THE COURT: But there's some contract that provides 7 8 for arbitration in London, I know that. I can't find this 9 document. Where is it in this record? MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, in terms of the actual 10 11 combination of documents, if you look at the -- I believe it's the Hans Borge affidavit, Exhibit 2, your Honor, is a 12 representative example of the nominations. Essentially these 13 14 were a recap of the conversation between UBS and Wilson where the terms of that particular transaction were agreed, and the 15 supplier's terms and conditions were referenced, which is 16 17 Exhibit 3 right behind it. THE COURT: So what you're saying is that there is no 18 overall contract pursuant to which the parties entered into an 19 ongoing arrangement, but instead there were individual 20 21 nominations which were made subject to the terms and 22 conditions? 23 MR. FREVOLA: Yes, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: In each of these instances. 25 MR. FREVOLA: Yes, and oral contracts in maritime law SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

3 79otwila Argument are completely enforceable. 1 2 THE COURT: Oral contracts are enforceable in a lot of 3 ways. Is there an oral overall contract someone will testify 4 to? 5 MR. FREVOLA: No, is this is a case-by-case basis. 6 THE COURT: So transaction by transaction. MR. FREVOLA: Yes, your Honor. 7 8 THE COURT: Thank you. I just needed to have that 9 cleared up. 10 Okay. Ms. Van Hemmen, you're more or less the 11 plaintiff here, you're the proponent here. Do you want to put somebody on the stand? If you want to point to things that I 12 should look at, if you want to argue. Obviously I have read 13 14 the papers, but as you all know, this is all Greek to me. MS. VAN HEMMEN: Yes, your Honor. There's been a 15 development over the weekend that has sort of taken me by 16 surprise, and it changes the posture of things here, and it was 17 a statement in the memorandum of law filed by Wilhelmsen in 18 opposition to our motion to vacate in which they stated in 19 either the final page or penultimate page that they no longer 20 21 intended to arbitrate in London but instead intend to litigate 22 New York. 23

It seems to me that their intentions to arbitrate in London was the factual predicate for the attachment that has occurred. 9 Section of the U.S. Arbitration Act, Section 8, SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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specifically allows an attachment under these very narrow

circumstances, and my understanding is those were the

circumstances under which we were operating, and then in just

one sentence at the very end of the memo of law I now learn

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I, as an attorney, can only analyze defenses based on the pleadings in front of me. That is a fundamental change from a position taken I think in three different paragraphs of the verified complaint.

THE COURT: The complaint that was presented to me indicates there was a contract subject to a London arbitration clause but that no arbitration had as of yet been commenced. I must say I think I overlooked this.

14 MS. VAN HEMMEN: Are you looking for the sentence in 15 the memorandum of law?

THE COURT: I'm looking -- I actually --

16 17 MS. VAN HEMMEN: It's on page 24 of Wilhelmsen's memorandum of law in opposition. It begins the very last 18 incomplete sentence on 24 and finishes up on 25. It seems to 19 me that on that basis alone, your Honor, the attachments would 20 21 have to be vacated subject to a new complaint that says in fact

22 what they do intend to do and the legal predicate for it.

23 MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, there's a case called The 24 Anaconda, your Honor, a Supreme Court case back in the 1940s 25 that deals with this.

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1	THE COURT: I haven't read it. I don't know anything
2	about it.
3	MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, we would be glad to brief
4	the supplementary. I argued the very point in front of Judge
5	Karas two weeks ago and Judge Karas in my view properly upheld
6	our attachment.
7	And essentially we're basically saying that while we
8	think that there is an arbitration clause that could be
9	incorporated here and govern, in light of circumstances that
10	have arisen over the last several weeks, my client has
11	basically said that the idea of a potential receivership
12	proceeding in Australia, a supplementary attachment proceeding
13	in New York and an arbitration in London, it make sense to
14	essentially waive the arbitration clause.
15	THE COURT: They may not waive the arbitration clause.
16	MR. FREVOLA: They may not, your Honor.
17	THE COURT: In which case I'm going to have a motion
18	to dismiss or stay pending arbitration.
19	MR. FREVOLA: Yes, your Honor, you could have that.
20	But in terms of basically
21	THE COURT: Can't we avoid that somehow?
22	MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, if they indicate they want
23	to go to London, and they do indicate that, then your Honor,
24	we'll stipulate to that and go to London.
25	Originally, the last hearing your Honor
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79otwila Argument THE COURT: Tell me about The Anaconda, the Supreme 1 Court case because I have to say I find to whole procedure 3 pretty -- I find it really outrageous that you can come in and 4 get an attachment before you commence any proceeding, and then 5 to be told that you're not going to commence the proceeding 6 that you told me to commence is a little problematic for me. 7 MR. FREVOLA: 9 USC Section 8 allows you to, instead of starting arbitration --8 9 THE COURT: I know that. 10 MR. FREVOLA: In terms --11 THE COURT: But it anticipates you're going to commence the arbitration. For example, if six months passed 12 and nothing happened I would definitely entertain a motion to 13 14 vacate the attachment on the ground this wasn't in aid of arbitration, this was something else. 15 MR. FREVOLA: Agreed, your Honor. In terms of -- I 16 17 believe it's the Anaconda this happened, there were several cases we mentioned, but The Anaconda is the premiere U.S. 18 Supreme Court case on this issue. It was an issue of whether 19 or not the attachment that had been brought was improper 20 21 because it had been done before an arbitration was commenced or anything had gone forward on it. Supreme Court said no, 22 23 Section 8 gives the absolute right to do this. 24 THE COURT: But --

MR. FREVOLA: And if they chose to forego their suit SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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1	in arbitration, the arbitration, and instead proceed through
2	litigation to enforce their rights. And essentially all that
3	statement
4	THE COURT: The citation for that we can pull it up
5	and I can add it to my reading list.
6	MR. FREVOLA: I don't have that citation on me, your
7	Honor. I get it to you a half hour after I leave this
8	courtroom.
9	THE COURT: Actually you have an associate here who
10	could go make a phone call back at the office and get it.
11	MR. FREVOLA: Sure.
12	THE COURT: That's why I used to sit at it was one
13	of my jobs when I was very young.
14	MS. VAN HEMMEN: Your Honor, would you like us to
15	proceed as though that had not bubbled up and continue with the
16	hearing?
17	THE COURT: We're dealing with more issues here.
18	MS. VAN HEMMEN: I'm sorry, your Honor?
19	THE COURT: Yes, let's go. I got to pick a jury this
20	afternoon.
21	MS. VAN HEMMEN: Your Honor, that issue aside, as fa
22	as the prime issue of whether there's even a maritime contract
23	here, you had not scheduled a reply, I therefore did not file a
24	reply.
25	THE COURT: I didn't want a renly

THE COURT: I didn't want a reply. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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MS. VAN HEMMEN: However, your Honor, I did take a 1

look at all of the cases that were cited by Mr. Frevola, and I

3 did draft something up, so if of the Court wants it I'll be

4 happy to what hand it up. Mr. Frevola had a copy of it since

Saturday. But if you would rather not, I will give it to you

6 orally. It might help in the future recapping my arguments.

MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, we don't have an objection to her handing it up.

THE COURT: You'll have to give it me orally anyway 10 because I'm not going to sit here and read it.

11 MS. VAN HEMMEN: Mr. Frevola relies heavily on a whole group of bumper broker cases and indicates that somehow those 12 cases support his position that the contract at issue here 13 14 should give rise to a maritime contract.

THE COURT: At least now I know what the contract at 15 issue here is. That was my problem all weekend is I couldn't 16 17 find the contract, therefore I was at a loss to evaluate what I 18 read in the cases with what the facts were.

19 MS. VAN HEMMEN: Your Honor, I have the piece of paper 20 that they contend --

21 THE COURT: It's open in front of me, and then attached to it are the Sumitomo general conditions. 22

MS. VAN HEMMEN: Those cases don't support the 23 24 proposition that they were cited for. In fact, taken as a 25 whole, support completely UBS's position in this case. Each

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and every one -- first of all, those cases were an analysis of whether or not the middle men bunker broker had a right to a maritime lien on the ships to which the marine fuel oil at issue in the transactions ultimately was loaded onto.

THE COURT: That's what this exercise used to be about until a few years ago.

7 MS. VAN HEMMEN: That's right, your Honor. So the 8 whole collection of cases having to do with the arrest of a ship and then the question of whether or not these bunker 9 10 brokers were going to have an in rem right in connection with that ship. In fact, the analysis is done under Federal 11 Maritime Lien Act statutory requirements, so it really is very 12 different than the analysis done for whether or not a maritime 13 14 contract exists.

However, both the statutory requirements and the analysis of whether maritime contract exists relate to whether or not certain claims should have the benefit of these unique and extreme maritime remedies. And so for that reason it seems to me that they do in fact relate to one another.

In each of the cases where the bunker broker contracted directly with the ship operator, the court allowed the bunker broker to have a lien on the ship. In each of the cases where the bunker broker was a middle man, a stranger to the ship on the one hand and a stranger to the vessel operator on the other hand, the courts refused to give that

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extraordinary maritime remedy. They held that they weren't

sufficiently closely related to the -- well, they didn't say

3 trafficking in vessels because of course that's a maritime

contract analysis, they held they hadn't furnished these things

on the order of the ship owner. There needed in each one of

those cases to be that direct relationship. There is no such

7 direct relationship in this case.

> UBS had a contract with a vessel operator. UBS then contracted with Wilhelmsen. Wilhelmsen used somebody else to deliver, Sumitomo delivered to the ship, UBS contracted with the vessel owner, Wilhelmsen was in the middle without either of those relationships. They would not get a maritime lien under the cases cited by Wilhelmsen in his opposition brief,

14 they should not get the benefits of a maritime contract in

connection with the Rule B attachment. 15

They also cited Trans Tech, which is a whole series --16 there was three Trans Tech decisions coming out of the Northern 17

18 District of California for the premises that this is another

bunker brokering claim where the Court granted admiralty 19

jurisdiction. Yes, it was a bunker broker in claim. The idea 20

21 that because that court extended admiralty jurisdiction you

22 should extent admiralty jurisdiction to this contract is

23 completely facile and a completely inaccurate analysis.

24 In Trans Tech the bunker broker had contracted 25 directly with the vessel owner. The litigation occurred when SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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- 1 the bunker broker arrested a ship, a totally different
- 2 procedure, and alleged in personam claims against the vessel
- 3 owner arising out of unjust enrichment principles of law.
- 4 Those were the claims on which the court did its analysis as to
- 5 whether or not this was admiralty jurisdiction. There no
- question that was there a contract between two middle men that
- 7 would or not be a maritime contract such as there would be
- 8 admiralty jurisdiction. Trans Tech has no relevance, your
- 9 Honor, other than the fact it's another litigation that came

10 out of these bunker broker cases.

11 There was one attachment case relied upon by

- 12 Wilhelmsen in its opposition brief, and that is the Gulf Marine
- 13 and Industries Supplies v New Filipino. And in that case the
- 14 provider of necessaries to the ship who had a contract with a
- 15 middle man was found to have a maritime contract. Of course,
- 16 that's consistent with UBS's position here, your Honor, because
- 17 the provider of necessaries in that instance provided them to
- 18 the ship. Sumitomo would like to have a maritime contract,
- 19 your Honor, they provided marine fuel oil to the ship. So the
- 20 Gulf Marine case does not cover the circumstances we have where
- 21 you've got a pure middle man; not contracting with a vessel
- 22 owner, not contracting or providing services directly to a
- 23 ship.
- Wilhelmsen has taken the position that the contracts
- are back to back and they're obligated just like Sumitomo, or SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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- 1 Sumitomo is a subagent and somehow the Exxon case makes it
- 2 completely irrelevant whether or not they have a personal
- 3 relationship with the ship owner or an interaction with a
- 4 vessel. And I suggest to you if you take a look at the
- 5 document they have tendered as an example of the contract, it's

6 not at all that clear.

7 It is my client's position the services provided by

- 8 Wilhelmsen were twofold. One was an introduction to Sumitomo.
- 9 And when you look at that piece of paper that is supposed to
- 10 set forth the obligations of the various parties as to what
- 11 went on here, Sumitomo is very clearly identified as a
- 12 supplier. It's perfectly clear that Sumitomo was going to
- 13 deliver. It's not perfectly clear that Wilhelmsen has delivery

14 obligations.

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15 Certainly there's arguments to be made -- if I were

16 the attorney on the other side I would be able to make the

17 argument that it was Wilhelmsen subcontracted to Sumitomo, but

- I don't think that piece of paper is at all clear and could be
- 19 argued both ways. I don't think it's adequate to bear the
- 20 burden of proof that falls on the shoulders of Wilhelmsen.
- 21 THE COURT: But the burden of proof, as I understand
- 22 it in these proceedings, is to have pled a prima facie case,
- 23 not to have actually proved.
- MS. VAN HEMMEN: Certainly not to prove, but in this
- 25 hearing here today, your Honor, they do have the obligation of

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establishing to you good cause for the allegations they made.

This contract makes perfectly clear the entity that is going to

deliver that marine fuel oil is Sumitomo, it doesn't make --

THE COURT: Going to deliver it, but the seller is Wilhelmsen.

6 MS. VAN HEMMEN: Correct. Conceded, your Honor.

7 Wilhelmsen sold it, that was a mechanism, it was set up as a

8 contract of sale. It was a mechanism, your Honor, to allow

9 Wilhelmsen to finance the deal. And I don't believe these

10 parties can confer the admiralty jurisdiction of this case by

11 themselves by the virtue of what they call their deals as

12 opposed to -- and really this gets back to the heart of the

13 Exxon case -- what the courts are calling -- what the Supreme

14 Court is calling on the District Courts to look at, to look at

15 what really is happening under these contracts. Not what

16 they're being called, not some technical requirement if you

17 call it a sale then you provided necessaries, but if you call

18 it consulting services it's something else.

19 Look at what really happened. Wilhelmsen sat in an

20 office. They provided the means for Sumitomo to act. Sumitomo

21 wouldn't act based on a verbal commitment from a stranger.

22 Sumitomo would act, they would deliver the marine fuel oil.

23 That's the maritime function. Sumitomo did it, and they

24 wouldn't do it until Wilhelmsen promised to pay. It's simply a

25 financing arrangement, your Honor.

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THE COURT: I hear you saying that then I look at the 1 name of your client. The name of your client is not Wilhelmsen 3 Bunker Brokerage, it's not Wilhelmsen Middle Man Services, it's 4 Wilhelmsen Premiere Marine Fuels, which sounds to me like a 5 company that provides marine fuels, and it has to obtain those 6 from somewhere.

7 But there is no contract between Sumitomo and UBS 8 incorporating the terms of Sumitomo's general conditions into the contract between UBS and Wilhelmsen. As I understand 9 10 contract law, which is something I do know something about -- I 11 don't know anything about admiralty but I do know something about contract law -- and it seems to me under elementary 12 contract law principles that means that you two guys have 13 14 agreed to make yourselves subject to Sumitomo's terms and conditions but the contract is still between you. 15

MS. VAN HEMMEN: I'm not at all sure, your Honor, that that statement "delivery will be made in accordance with supplier's terms and conditions" in a document that identifies three players, not just two, a seller, a supplier and a buyer, that a statement that delivery, one precise portion of the undertakings done according to supplier's terms and conditions in fact would be read to mean the contract is governed in whole by Sumitomo's terms and conditions.

THE COURT: I agree with you. I agree with you as a matter of reading the contract. But that being so, then this SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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is the contract and the fact that Sumitomo's name appears on

this contract doesn't make it any less a contract between your

3 client and --

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MS. VAN HEMMEN: But it does, your Honor, make it very evident that Wilhelmsen isn't going to do the thing that

relates to the trafficking of vessels. The contract itself

7 makes it perfectly evident --

THE COURT: That Wilhelmsen is going to get the oil from someplace else.

10 MS. VAN HEMMEN: That a third party is going to bring

11 its tug and barge alongside. In fact, your Honor, there is 12

also a statement in Wilhelmsen's memorandum of law, or it might

be an affidavit from either Attorney Frevola or Hans Borge, in 13

14 any event where they talk about they identify this as the

Wilhelmsen UBS contract and then they say and there's also a 15

Wilhelmsen Sumitomo contract. But nowhere in their papers, 16

your Honor, is the Wilhelmsen Sumitomo contract attached to an 17

18 affidavit delivered to this Court.

19 I think the reason is that this piece of paper in fact

is the contract between all three parties, and I think this 20

21 email, if you see the way it's sent, it goes to USS UBS. It's

from Wilhelmsen, but if you look at the introductory sentence, 22

"Acting in accordance with instructions from buyers, we confirm 23

24 our verbal order and nominate as follows." I suspect that that

25 precise email is sent directly to Sumitomo thereafter, that

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this is not only the contract between USS and Wilhelmsen but also Wilhelmsen and Sumitomo.

Which to me, your Honor, if I were litigating exactly what the obligations are under the contract, I would argue that Sumitomo perhaps alone has the obligation to deliver. If I were Wilhelmsen's client and there had been a failure to deliver, which there wasn't, but then you might have a maritime case, but if there had been -- I think there's an argument to be made this is a contract with three parties and it's Sumitomo

But in any event, whether you find that compelling or not, I'm not standing in the shoes to do that, I am trying to bring to the Court's attention that if you look through the structure that the attorneys would like you to see this contract having because it suits their analysis, if you look to in practice with what the parties do, you will see Wilhelmsen was very distant from the trafficking of vessels. UBS was making undertakings to ship owners. Sumitomo was, Wilhelmsen wasn't.

There was a lot of paper submitted to the Court having to do with the underlying dispute. While the nature of the dispute has relevance under the Second Circuit's threshold inquiry, I believe that the presentation made by Wilhelmsen went well beyond a discussion of the nature of the dispute. It appears to attempt to fully educate the Court on the merits and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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who doing the maritime component of it.

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to address it.

79otwila Argument give the impression that it was not a dispute that had merit and perhaps even a sort of --3 THE COURT: But you should not worry about that. I 4 wouldn't worry about that. I have this ability, from years of having too much to do and not enough time, to focus on what's really at issue here. And what is really at issue here is is 6 7 there a maritime contract or not. That is really the principal issue. And then there's a secondary issue about Rae Corp., and as we all know there is not an issue, as far as I'm concerned, 10 about Winter Storm because I'm just a District Court. 11 MS. VAN HEMMEN: Understood. So I would say simply, your Honor, that most of the materials put before the Court on 12 the issue of the underlying dispute, we're here to say, first 13 14 of all, and that all they ultimately establish --THE COURT: I don't care about that dispute, I'm 15 really not interested in it, it has nothing to do with me. I'm 16 trying to tell you I'm not paying any attention to that. 17 18 MS. VAN HEMMEN: I'll move on. Rae Corp. --19 THE COURT: I understand why they did it, they did it 20 because your client said they hadn't been paid, but --21 MS. VAN HEMMEN: And they tried to create the impression that they had. 22 23 THE COURT: It's none of my business.

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MS. VAN HEMMEN: If you don't care then I'm not going

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THE COURT: It's none of my business. There is no such lawsuit before me.

MS. VAN HEMMEN: Okay. Then I move on, your Honor, to the standard of proof relevant here today for maintaining the cause of action against Rae Corp. Rule E itself has built into it a heightened showing by virtue of the fact that there is the post attachment arrest -- excuse me, the post attachment hearing, and that heightened scrutiny is necessary, your Honor, because of the extraordinary powers that Rule E gives birth to.

And so in this case we sit here based on Wilhelmsen's perception of having been aggrieved and the funds of my client are soaked up to the tune of a million dollars, and they're hoping to get more, so the consequences are extreme.

They have done it now not only with their contracting partner but also with an apparent affiliate bringing these two closely related companies to their knees based on what they think they might find, that they don't know it to be the case, your Honor, and what they have observed are benign facts. There's nothing illegal, there's nothing fraudulent, there's nothing dominating about one man being the director of two companies, about those companies sharing the resource of a place, of a telephone number, these things, there's nothing fraudulent about it.

And the reason I say fraudulent is, as you know, the standard of proof in New York is you would have to show such a SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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domination and/or fraudulent acts before they would be entitled

to the type of relief that they are seeking. But in the

meantime, they have been, based on really what amounts to

speculation, in a position to bring the company, this other

5 affiliated company to its knees.

> There is a lot of case law that supports a finding that the showing has got to be greater, it's got to be beyond simple allegations in the pleading, and I don't think that they have made the adequate showing. And I would ask the Court, in the light of the extraordinary power of these attachments, insist on the heightened standard, and under that heightened standard I say that the case has not been made and it should

13 be -- the attachment based on it should be vacated. 14 The only thing I would like to add about EFTs, your Honor, I don't want waste anybody's time, however a nuance that 15

we have not discussed a way through it that another District 16

Judge here in the Southern District has seen to be appropriate 17 18 was limiting the application of the Winter Storm decision to

the very specific facts of that case, and that is to EFTs 19

transferred from defendants to third parties but not permit the 20 21 attachment of EFTs from third parties to defendants.

22 And given the question --

THE COURT: Though it's interesting to me, if you were going to try to limit the idea of Winter Storm, it would make much more sense to limit the transactions the other way,

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because the money that's coming into your bank account is more

your money than the money that is going out of your bank

3 account to pay somebody else.

MS. VAN HEMMEN: I saw the equities of that and I had

that thought process myself, your Honor. However, I don't

think it's an equitable argument, I think it's a legal,

7 technical argument that one judge felt was the way through the

8 quandary that the District was given in the Winter Storm

9 decision, but the feeling that perhaps another panel or the

10 Second Circuit en banc would not have followed and the guidance

11 that the Court seems to be trying to give in the way of

12 footnotes and what have you, and I ask that this Court be

13 similarly guided.

THE COURT: And the decision again, you're talking

15 about Judge Rakoff's decision.

MR. FREVOLA: Seamar, your Honor.

17 MS. VAN HEMMEN: And your Honor, I think everything

18 else was in the brief. And so I don't want to simply recite

19 the same things over and over again.

THE COURT: The briefs were obviously extremely

21 helpful.

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MS. VAN HEMMEN: I'll sit until your Honor has a

23 question for me.

24 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Frevola.

MR. FREVOLA: Yes, your Honor. Thank you.

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Your Honor, I after seeing the reply brief of opposing counsel I actually looked a look at a couple of things to try to help clarify this. And something that actually is very helpful in clarifying, your Honor, is a District Court decision in the Exxon case itself, the one that was appealed up to the Supreme Court. And I have copies, if I may bring one up, your Honor, I have one for opposing counsel as well.

This is the first one. I have also got the reconsideration document there because there's one little bit

in the reconsideration as well. But there is a very
interesting series of facts and also arguments made by the

opposition which ultimately the Supreme Court found to be not compelling.

If you look at page 2 of the first decision, the second paragraph -- sorry, the second column, first full paragraph about halfway down, it says in return for Exxon's services, Arabian Marine, which is the actual physical supplier, agreed to pay Exxon a commission, i.e. like a broker. As opposed to where you have multiple contracts, it was

As opposed to where you have multiple contracts, it was actually a commission based apparently on a percentage.

21 Also the next sentence --

THE COURT: I had understood that where Wilhelmsen took its profit in this whole crazy arrangement was on the spread between the price at which it bought from Sumitomo and

25 the price at which it sold to you.

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79otwila Argument MR. FREVOLA: There was a mark up. It was not a 1 2 standard mark up. 3 THE COURT: In other words, no commission was being 4 paid. 5 MR. FREVOLA: No, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: No commission was being paid, this was an 7 arbitrage. 8 MR. FREVOLA: It was a mark up, your Honor. And 9 wasn't a standard mark up, it changed depending on what the day 10 was. 11 THE COURT: It was an arbitrage based on the existing market for fuel oil on that day, but there was a spread and 12 that spread stayed in Wilhelmsen's pocket. 13 14 MR. FREVOLA: And in their favor as well. But your Honor, one of the things that I would like to point out is 15 while they arranged for a physical supplier to do this, in 16 event that something happened here -- in the Asian rim, if an 17 18 earthquake happened in Japan, which is not unforeseeable, and a Tsunami damaged Tokyo Bay and Sumitomo is not able to perform, 19 at that juncture Wilhelmsen is trying to find the stuff himself 20 21 or bring in the bunkers from Korea or in the Chinese mainland 22 to fulfill its obligations or they're liable. 23 THE COURT: Your position is they're not simply an 24 intermediary, they agreed to supply you, you couldn't care less 25

where they get the stuff. It could come from Sumitomo, it SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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could come from Aramco, it could come from Marathon Oil. You don't care where it comes from as long as -- and the Navy

3 certainly doesn't care where it comes from as long as it gets 4 into the ship.

MR. FREVOLA: And I think taking it a step further, 6 there's a distinction that I think also comes to the play in the charter party context, and I think it helps clarify this situation versus a brokerage situation. Charter brokers will

9 take a ship owner and wed them up with a chartering. There's a

10 different situation, however, that occurs and that's called

subcharters where someone -- again they arbitrage essentially, 11

they wind up time chartering a vessel or voyage chartering a 12

vessel but then flip it around and do a back-to-back charter 13

14 party with third party under another separate document and both 15

of those documents are maritime contracts. I think that my colleague here would agree to that.

In the charter broker situation, when the charterer pays the ship owner for the charter hire, 1.25 percent of that gets paid to the broker because there's a contract between the two end parties and the broker gets their commission. Here not only were there two separate parts but Wilhelmsen has paid Sumitomo under that other contract.

Now there was a mention in terms of the contract that governs Sumitomo and Wilhelmsen in terms of their agreements.

25 Their agreement likewise is the Sumitomo --

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THE CO	URT: I'm not

particularly interested in that 2 agreement, I'm interested in the agreement between -- the

- 3 agreement pursuant to which this nomination took place, and I'm
- becoming increasingly comfortable because as I'm sitting here I
- remember that the last case that I tried before I went on the
- bench was on behalf of a long-time client Northville
- Industries. We all know what business Northville Industries
- was in, it was the fuel business, and was a middle man. And
- Northville would have a contract with a client pursuant to
- 10 which contract it would nominate someone to do something.

11 Now there's an earlier contract than this, I take it it's an oral agreement. 12

13 MR. FREVOLA: Yes, your Honor.

14 THE COURT: I have no evidence about it, there is no evidence about it in the record, nothing. 15

MR. FREVOLA: That would be a recap --16

17 THE COURT: No, no, no, nobody has testified to the 18 conversation that gave rise to the agreement pursuant to which 19 his nomination was made. It's likely forgotten about.

20 MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, I believe that Mr. Borge's 21 name is on that recap.

22 THE COURT: His name is on the recap.

23 MR. FREVOLA: And he put an affirmation in here, your

24 Honor, and in paragraph 5 of his affirmation it says each time

25 UBS contacted Wilhelmsen to bunker a nominated vessel

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79otwila Argument Wilhelmsen replied with an email confirming the agreement. 1 2 THE COURT: Let's go back. Paragraph 4, Wilhelmsen 3 entered into a series of agreements with UBS to provide vessels 4 nominated by UBS with bunkers in the ports of Sasebo and Naha in Japan. Before any of those nominations took place there had to have been a conversation between somebody at Wilhelmsen and 7 somebody at UBS, and it's that conversation it seems to me that 8 sets up the --9 MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, I think --10 THE COURT: -- that's integral to the agreement. 11 MR. FREVOLA: The affirmation may be a little inartful in that the next paragraph, the following paragraph explains 12 how the email came about. It came after Wilhelmsen was 13 14 contacted by UBS to confirm the agreement that was reached by contact. I suspect it was either telephone or email. I didn't 15 get that from Mr. Borge directly, I didn't develop that 16 information, but it was a recap of the contact saying we will 17 18 do what you asked us to do. 19 Your Honor, there's one more section of the Exxon District Court opinion which I thought was very helpful, it's 20 21 the second full paragraph on page 5, left-hand column, and 22 starting with the second sentence of that paragraph, I'll read it. It's, meaning Exxon, Exxon Services, with respect to the 23 24 Jedda delivery, included taking Waterman's order, contacting 25 Arabian Marine, who was the local physical supplier,

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79otwila Argument maintaining a bunker's contract with that physical supplier, Arabian Marine, and advancing Waterman the purchase price by 3 paying Arabian Marine. All which happened here, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: It never actually possessed the fuel. 5 MR. FREVOLA: And never had the title to the fuel in 6 that case. Here at least they had title. It never actually 7 possessed the fuel. Indeed, pursuant to Exxon's contract with Arabian Marine, title to the fuel passed directly from marine to the hooper, which was the vessel. In return for these 9 10 services, Exxon received a commission which was deducted from 11 Arabian Marine's invoices to Exxon. In sum Exxon's rule in the transaction was strictly "shore side." This what the District 12 13 Court held here similar to my opponents arguments here today. 14 And on these facts, your Honor, I submit this sounds more like a brokerage contract than ours. The Supreme Court 15 says it was a maritime contract because Justice Marshall 16 understood you can't look at one and say it's maritime and 17 18 another and say it's not. 19 And also significantly, your Honor, do you see the 20 reference to the financing? 21 THE COURT: Yes. 22 MR. FREVOLA: The whole reason that Exxon got back 23 involved in this, if you read this opinion, Exxon was doing it locally, Arabian Marine started giving discounts to its 24 25 customers that Exxon couldn't agree, so they got out of the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

79otwila Argument loop and as a courtesy they kept in the loop helping to facilitate these nominations. But eventually --3 THE COURT: So they didn't get out of the loop. 4 MR. FREVOLA: But they weren't actually contractually 5 bound, were just acting --6 THE COURT: You mean they were no longer supplying out 7 of their own reserve. 8 MR. FREVOLA: Precisely. And no longer paying ahead of time. There came a point where Waterman had problems 9 10 financially, so Arabian Marine said we're not going to do this with them anymore unless someone can essentially stand up for 11 them financially, and that's when Exxon got in. If this is the 12 financing issue, the Supreme Court has said financing is fine 13 14 by the Supreme Court, your Honor. So that's the facts of the Exxon decision. 15 And turning to the U.S. Supreme Court Exxon decision, 16 your Honor, this goes to the issue of this maritime lien 17 18 question versus maritime claim. And as an issue in fact, your Honor, I submit to you that the mere fact that Rule B exists 19 20 means that not only maritime lien claims are maritime but there 21 are other maritime claims out there that are maybe not worthy of a lien but nevertheless fall within the admiralty 22 23 jurisdiction, and that's what we're talking about today. 24 In Wilhelmsen's case there could not be a lien on this 25 vessel. And there's a simple reason why. There's a statute SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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called the Public Vessels Act. Because of that, if you're

dealing with a U.S. government vessel there is no right to a

3 lien against the vessel. You can't arrest it.

In the Exxon case --

THE COURT: I'm shocked, shocked.

MR. FREVOLA: In the Exxon U.S. Supreme Court case, the question before the U.S. Supreme Court was not whether

8 there was a lien. Indeed, one of their last sentences in the

9 decision they say we express no view on whether Exxon is

10 entitled to a maritime lien under the Federal Maritime Lien

Act. The issue is not before us and we leave it to be decided

12 on remand.

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What they say further up in the same paragraph, like the District Court we believe it is clear when Exxon directly

supplies and refuels Waterman ships the arrangement is maritime

in nature. In this case the only difference between New York 16

delivery over which the District Court asserted jurisdiction 17

and the Jedda delivery is that in Jedda Exxon bought the fuels

from a third party and had the third party deliver them to the 19

vessel where in New York they did it themselves. 20

21 And your Honor, here again, if there was a brokerage

situation where there was a charter party and they received a 22

commission, I would say maybe you have a situation where it's 23 24

not a maritime contract. In the fuels industry, your Honor, my

25 opponent here has not given one single case where a fuel

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- 1 brokerage contract or agreement is non-maritime. There are
- 2 cases where it was found not to be a maritime lien, but there's
- 3 a reason for that. A maritime claim only needs necessaries
- 4 applied to the vessel, two elements. They get that lien, you
- 5 need the third element, which is basically at the order or the
- 6 authority of the owner. And that's why the Gale Head decision,
- 7 your Honor, is so important. Because the 11th Circuit in Gale
- 8 Head essentially said everyone agrees on this. The first two
- 9 elements are -- there's no question it was done.
- And that's why, your Honor, I cited this Gulf Marine
- 11 New Filipino case, because it's one -- there's not many out
- 12 here, your Honor, I looked and actually found another one,
- 13 which I'll cite to you in a second, but Gulf Marine is very
- 14 handy case, because Gulf Marine involves a situation where
- 15 neither the vessel owner nor the vessel charter ordered the
- 16 supplies. They actually got an agent to do it for them,
- 17 similar to UBS. And that agent went out, the agent's name was
- 18 New Filipino, New Filipino winds up going out and getting
- 19 somebody to procure supplies for the vessel, just like
- Wilhelmsen here.
- Now in New Filipino it wasn't done by a subcontractor
- 22 of the plaintiff, the plaintiff themselves actually did perform
- 23 the contract. But what's important here is that the Court
- 24 found that this provision of services to the vessel at the
- 25 order of a general agent was sufficient to create a maritime

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79otwila Argument claim even though it wasn't provided at the order of the vessel's owner or the charterer, it was somebody said please 3 provision this vessel 4 THE COURT: What's the citation of that case? 5 MR. FREVOLA: That case is not reported in the Federal 6 Reporter, it's 2001 Westlaw 277924 (Eastern District of 7 Louisiana, 2001), Westlaw pages 3 and 4 are important. 8 Let me say the Court finds that the plaintiffs have

satisfied the requirements establishing that the claim is
maritime in nature as it concerns the furnishing of necessaries
to a vessel. Just like in Gale Head where they say that the
first two items, necessaries to the vessel, were satisfied. I
mean this is something that you'll see in all these cases. One
of the reasons why there isn't much case law on this is because
I think it's pretty well accepted

I think it's pretty well accepted. 15 I have another case, a 9th Circuit decision that talks 16 17 about a close analogy as well. And when I saw that the New Filipino case was being challenged by my opponent's reply 18 brief, I went out and got you another one. It's called Hinkins 19 Steamship v Freighters, Inc. This one is nice and short, your 20 21 Honor, it's so short in fact that if you take a moment to read the first four paragraphs of the case, your Honor, you'll see, 22 23 I think -- I'll explain the related parties afterwards, but 24 it's pretty short and sweet. 25 THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. FREVOLA: Now your Honor, here the vessel owner essentially or the charterer of the vessel was Freighters Inc.
Freighters Inc. had an agent, again like UBS, which is Bulk

1 Food So it ween't the vessel evener or vessel charterer but a

4 Food. So it wasn't the vessel owner or vessel charterer but an

agent for them or a contractor, an independent contractor of

6 them, Bulk Food, who asked for the provision of the necessaries.

And in this case, your Honor, the person who was asked to provide the necessaries did not provide those necessaries themself. They actually went out and got other people to provide them, and the defendant said that's not a maritime claim, they don't do anything themselves. And in the 9th Circuit again, 30 years ago, said of course it is.

So I can keep trying to find more precedent in this, your Honor, but think in the fuel context -- there is no question that in fuel context there are multiple tiered contracts, and the Supreme Court looked at this and said they're maritime contracts.

In terms of the issue of farming out the responsibility, so long as there an obligation contractually you have to provide something that puts you inside the maritime context. It's not as if you're trying to procure a maritime contract if you have the obligation yourself.

And your Honor, in our brief actually we talk about that. There's, for example, in a financing or a guarantee SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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- 1 situation, a guarantee of payment in the event a principal
- winds up defaulting on the contract it's not maritime. But if
- you guarantee to perform the contract if there's a default, it
- 4 is. Here Sumitomo wasn't able to perform, it fell back on
- 5 Wilhelmsen. I mean Section 2 of the Sumitomo terms talk about
- delivery. They talk about the obligation to deliver by or
- 7 within a period stipulated, Section 2.1.

Few more items, your Honor, and I think I will have covered it all.

THE COURT: I'm not sure what point you were just trying to make.

MR. FREVOLA: 2.1 says --

13 THE COURT: The obligation of seller and seller here 14 is Sumitomo.

MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, for the adopted -- for the nomination, the seller is Wilhelmsen, they're seller on the

17 nomination in the email. So they have the obligation to

18 deliver by or within a certain time, be it from Sumitomo --

19 THE COURT: See, I don't think that's correct. This

20 is a contract between Sumitomo and somebody, and in this

- 21 contract Sumitomo in this document, Sumitomo, not anybody else,
- 22 is identified as seller. So every reference in this piece of
- 23 paper to seller is to Sumitomo. It's not to the person who has
- 24 been nominated the seller in some other agreement that says
- 25 delivery will be made in accordance with the supplier's terms

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and conditions. This just says this is how Sumitomo is going to deliver to UBS.

MR. FREVOLA: But your Honor, what relevance would that have with regard to -- if the contract is not something that would bind UBS, what relevance would that have other than we're referring to those terms as the remainder of the terms? This is an industry practice.

7 THE COURT: I hear you, I understand, but that doesn't 8 mean that I can read this contract and substitute the word 9 10 Wilhelmsen for the word Sumitomo next to the parenthetical that says seller. That is not what it means when it says delivery 11 will be made in accordance with the supplier's terms and 12 conditions. The supplier's terms and conditions are that 13 14 Sumitomo obligates itself to deliver the goods specified on something of the face of the sale -- I can't even read that --15 a purchase agreement between the seller and buyer by the time 16 or within the period stipulated on the face of the contract. 17

MR. FREVOLA: Even so, if that's the case, your Honor, still the email itself talks about, for example, in this case
March 26 they are going to be delivering 2,130 metric tons of

21 fuel oil to that vessel, and if they couldn't get it from

22 Sumitomo they would have to get it from somewhere.

In terms of a couple other things here, your Honor, the issue about Wilhelmsen being in a remote office and not

25 being down there on the piers or operating the terminal

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- 1 equipment, that type of thing, that isn't the nature of the
- 2 maritime business today in many aspects. The charter
- 3 subcharter example I gave your Honor where two back-to-back
- 4 charters occur, a couple weeks ago I was at an office of one of
- 5 our clients that does that very thing. And I walked in, your
- 6 Honor, there are computer screens, people on the phone and they
- 7 are a ship owner, but the only thing they have is an office
- 8 with people doing the operations and doing the work from their
- 9 desk managing the day-to-day operations, or in the case of
- 10 Wilhelmsen, the management of providing fuel to ships.

In the Exxon case, somebody -- actually the Court

- refers to the fact that Exxon's performance was in the U.S. on
- 13 the Jedda contract, and nevertheless that performance in the
- 14 U.S., even though remote and far away, was still found to be
- 15 maritime. It's in the Exxon decisions.
- And one other case in terms of the preliminary
- 17 contract doctrine, and also this issue of being an actual
- 18 person bound to perform versus a person who is not bound to
- 19 perform in a maritime contract, I think the late Judge Casey's
- 20 decision in Sea Transport Contractors lays it out very well in
- 21 terms of distinction, and he makes that point very well, and I
- 22 commend it to you.

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- THE COURT: Let's talk about Rae Corp.
- MR. FREVOLA: Yes, your Honor.
- THE COURT: So we're at a hearing, we're beyond the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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- 1 pleading stage, we're at a hearing. What is your obligation at
- 2 this point under the Admiralty Supplemental Rules? And I ask
- 3 this question because I wonder what happens to these
- 4 proceedings. Somebody comes in and somebody gets an
- 5 attachment, somebody else comes in and says the attachment
- should be vacated. The attachment is provisional remedy, and
- you vacate or don't vacate. If you don't vacate the attachment

8 you don't dismiss the proceeding.

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When does this proceeding go away? What is the ultimate adjudication here?

MR. FREVOLA: Typically what happens is one of several things, your Honor. If there is no jurisdictional clause or the parties waive arbitration, obviously it goes forward here.

A lot of times what happens is there --

THE COURT: You mean the underlying dispute? There's no claim here for the underlying dispute. That would be a different lawsuit.

MR. FREVOLA: Again, your Honor, unless we decide to waive going to arbitration, because we did bring this as a complaint and said that there is this limited arbitration clause.

Again one of the things that made us discuss this was the question at the last court conference both my opponent and your Honor yourself both raised this a very strong objection to the idea there was an arbitration clause here. Now in terms of SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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rather than fighting that issue out, it seemed to make sense to essentially say we'll go forward here and waive any arbitration right we have.

THE COURT: And you would then serve an amended complaint that asserted not your claim for attachment, that is all you asserted here, but it would be your intent to serve an amended complaint to bring in the proceeding? The proceeding here is for a remedy of provisional remedy, an attachment, that's all.

MR. FREVOLA: But your Honor, you can do that -- I don't believe that there would need to be an amended complaint, your Honor, only because --

12 your Honor, only because -13 THE COURT: Well, I'm telling you there would have to
14 be. Because this complaint says you actually don't have any
15 jurisdiction over the underlying dispute, but we're coming to
16 you for an attachment, for injunction in aid of arbitration.
17 No claim is made in the amended complaint for the underlying

relief because as of the time that the amended complaint was
filed you were going to London to get your underlying relief.
So yes, you would have to amend the pleading. But if
you say go forward in New York, it would be your intention that

the underlying dispute be litigated here in the ordinary course, and at the end you would win or lose and the attachment would be vacated or you take the money.

MR. FREVOLA: Exactly.
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THE COURT: And if one were to go forward in London, the attachment would continue into such time as the London arbitration had concluded and there would undoubtedly be a motion by someone to confirm the arbitration award which would probably be here because here's the money.

MR. FREVOLA: But in the Ulysses Shipping case before Judge Scheindlin a little less than two years ago, Mr. Lennon and I wound up escrowing the money after having our 4F hearing, and essentially it's been drawn partially. We're waiting for a cost award in England to resolve the rest of it. But escrowing the funds are also another option that happens relatively frequently.

THE COURT: Okay. Is this a Rule E case?

MR. FREVOLA: Well, Rule E4F is the hearing we're having here, your Honor, that's what they call it. It's the prompt hearing to see if we can vacate the attachment.

The question about Rae Corp. and what governs, what standard governs. The assertions against Rae Corp., your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FREVOLA: I'm actually -- I am getting ready to argue that in front of Second Circuit.

THE COURT: I see.

MR. FREVOLA: So I'm relatively familiar with that issue.

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THE COURT: You're certainly familiar with your position on the issue.

3 MR. FREVOLA: I'm familiar with both, actually, your

4 Honor. And I would submit to your Honor, either way I think we

5 have met our standard. The initial standard or the one that I

5 think is being espoused by a lot of District Courts right now,

7 including Judge Wood in Tide Line, wind up saying that all that

has to be alleged is a prima facie admiralty claim. And that

9 very well --

THE COURT: Rae Corp. -- there is a contract with Rae

11 Corp. I want to know what you have to prove to get this 12 attachment extended to a party who you claim in very conclusory

terms is an alter ego.
 MR. FREVOLA: Well, your Honor, I think that again a

15 lot of the decisions say all you have to do is allege it.

THE COURT: I find that offensive.

17 MR. FREVOLA: So do I, your Honor.

THE COURT: So let's assume that I'm not one of the

19 District Courts who says that.

MR. FREVOLA: Why are we having this hearing if not

21 for having to prove something else. I agree with you. So even

22 prima facie admiralty claim is a lot of what these decisions

23 say. I don't think that --

24 THE COURT: So prove it.

MR. FREVOLA: The other standard is the reasonable SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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- ground standard, your Honor. And the reasonable ground
- 2 standard essentially says you don't have to show fire but we
- 3 want to see some smoke. And in the Ulysses case, going back to
- 4 that one, that involved three separate entities of the Fal
- 5 Group which was a United Arab Emerits series of companies. And
- 6 I was representing the defendant, the Fal Group, and my
- 7 adversary had filed a complaint saying they were all alter
- 8 egos.
- 9 It was a rather conclusory complaint, it didn't
- 10 include offices, telephone numbers, intertwined email
- 11 addresses; the fact on the advertisement for Rae Corp. it says
- 12 Rae Corp. uses UBS USS's terms and conditions, referring to its
- 13 other company, using the Rae Corp. emails for UBS business,
- 14 things like that. But on top of that, your Honor, we also, as
- 15 you know from the last hearing, we intercepted a payment made
- 16 by Rae Corp. to pay the counsel bills of UBS.
- 17 In Ulysses Shipping, if you look at that case, the one
- 18 fact in Ulysses Shipping was sufficient for Judge Scheindlin to
- 19 hold not own the primary defendant, Fal Shipping, but its
- 20 affiliate, Fal Oil had paid one hire payment, one hire payment
- 21 for a vessel that had been charted by Fal Shipping sent by Fal
- 22 Oil. And Judge Scheindlin says that's it, I'm seeing
- 23 commingling, that's all that has to be shown right now, and we
- 24 have a payment by one company on behalf of another.
- THE COURT: Clarify the timing for me. When did you SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

79otwila Argument file your amended complaint? 2 MR. FREVOLA: I believe -- actually I have it right 3 here. 4 THE COURT: I have got received in my chambers 5 August 23rd. 6 MR. FREVOLA: Yes, your Honor. Actually --7 THE COURT: So when was the payment intercepted? 8 MR. FREVOLA: I believe --9 THE COURT: September something or --10 MR. FREVOLA: September 3rd maybe. 11 THE COURT: So Rae Corp. was a party. MR. FREVOLA: Yes, your Honor. 12 13 THE COURT: So Rae Corp. could have been paying its 14 own legal bills. Rae Corp. wasn't doing anything on behalf of UBS by advancing that payment, Rae Corp. at this point is a 15 16 party. 17 MR. FREVOLA: Well, your Honor, Ms. Van Hemmen at the 18 hearing said the money being sent to her was for previous legal bills incurred for representing UBS, and the night before she 19 had been told that Rae Corp. had this -- she was retained the 20 21 night before by Rae Corp. after the attachment occurred. 22 THE COURT: Factually accurate? 23 MS. VAN HEMMEN: Yes. I was retained the night before 24 I got to court. 25 THE COURT: Thank you. SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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MR. FREVOLA: So your Honor, I would submit that even using a higher reasonable grounds standard under Ulysses Shipping, there's another one called Linea Naviera talked about the same thing in the Southern District of Florida, the Occocra (ph) case, which is the Eastern District of Louisiana. They talk about not having proved your case but if you do show indicia that's enough. And I think of we have got past the prima facie case standard to a reasonable ground.

Your Honor, I have got the issue on -- I actually got my other brief to Judge Karas on the arbitration thing. Let me make sure I have answered the last issue here before moving on to The Anaconda.

Your Honor, just in terms of the Seamar case, one of 13 14 the things they talked about in terms of these wire transfers is it's a joint property in interest between the originator and 15 beneficiaries while it's being sent. That's why both going and 16 coming you wind up having the same problem. Judge Rakoff did 17 18 wind up deciding Seamar thinking Aqua Stoli was a harbinger of things to come, and essentially none of his colleagues on the 19 20 bench in the Southern District have joined that.

I think there are about seven or eight cases at least that all afterwards says Seamar just doesn't reflect what the law is right now. So I submit to you, your Honor, that the great majority of cases here in the Southern District for beneficiary-type attachments rule that Winter Storm is the law

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1 of the Second Circuit.

MR. FREVOLA: On the issue, your Honor, if you could

give me a moment to get my bearings on the other brief here.

4 THE COURT: Sure.

MS. VAN HEMMEN: Your Honor, could I address

6 Mr. Frevola's other remarks?

THE COURT: Well, he's going to want to listen to that.

9 MR. FREVOLA: Yes, your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: Let me given him a minute to get his bearings.

MR. FREVOLA: It was The Anaconda, your Honor.

13 Happily I was right. The cite is The Anaconda v The American

14 Sugar Refining Company, 322 U.S. 42 (1944). Even got the '40s

15 right.

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The Supreme Court -- quote from page 45 I think is

17 helpful, I'll read from my brief because I think it's more

18 coherent than trying to find it other way. On appeal the

19 Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's commencement of the

20 lawsuit to obtain security prior to commencing arbitration was

21 proper and specifically contemplated by the Federal Arbitration

22 Act, and that the Federal Arbitration Act permitted the

23 plaintiff to even forego arbitration if it so chose subject to

24 defendant's right to request arbitration.

And the quote from the case is: Here again the act SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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- 1 plainly contemplates that one who has agreed to arbitrate may
- 2 nevertheless prosecute his cause of action in admiralty and
- 3 protect his opponent's right to arbitration by court order.
- 4 Far from ousting or permitting the parties to the agreement to
- oust the court of jurisdiction of the cause of action, the
- 6 statute recognizes the jurisdiction and saves the right of an

7 aggrieved party to invoke it.

And your Honor, I also --

9 THE COURT: Can you help me out here, tell me what the 10 facts were in Anaconda.

MR. FREVOLA: I have got a copy of the case here, your

12 Honor, give me a moment.

Unfortunately, your Honor, there is an incredible amount of detail.

15 THE COURT: Is it at least possible to say that it's a

16 case in which the attachment was obtained in the manner that

17 you obtained this attachment following which Anaconda or

18 whoever it was never commenced arbitration but instead came to

19 court to litigate the underlying claim? Are those the facts?

MR. FREVOLA: I would say it's fair to say that they

21 commenced it as a straightforward maritime lawsuit, your Honor,

22 as opposed to saying that there might be an arbitration clause

23 in it.

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I think there may have been one other case that may

25 have been helpful. There was a Greenwich Marine Case that was SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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decided by the Justice Marshall when he was on the Second

Circuit, that's Greenwich Marine Inc. v SS Alexandra, 339 F.2d

3 901 (2d Cir. 1965).

4 One of the things also that Greenwich Marine says is it talks about this issue of not having to have a separate petition to compel arbitration as well as the complaint to file a lawsuit with. I would think that the liberal pleading requirements, if there was some type of defect that didn't make this plain that we could stay here in New York that would be

9 10 something where --

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THE COURT: At the time that you filed this document you didn't want to stay in New York. You can't say that you filed this document intending to litigate in New York. You didn't. You intended to litigate in London.

MR. FREVOLA: I think point is there is a lot of precedent to say that you can decide to forego that.

THE COURT: Anyone can decide to forego, but what you 17 18 can't do is not litigate somewhere. You have to litigate somewhere. If you have an attachment and I found out three 19 20 months later that you weren't litigating anywhere I would sua 21 sponte vacate the attachment. So you have to litigate 22 somewhere.

23 And if it's going to be here, fine, it will get thrown into the mix, it will be litigated as a case in the ordinary 24 25 course. You'll have to file a new pleading and your opponent SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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has an absolute right to demand arbitration which could set us off in another frolic and detour.

MR. FREVOLA: I would check with her before I file an amended complaint.

I believe I answered everything, your Honor.

6 Everything else is in our brief.

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7 MS. VAN HEMMEN: May I, your Honor?

THE COURT: Absolutely.

9 MS. VAN HEMMEN: On the issue, it appears that The

10 Anaconda -- I don't know it, I haven't read it, it appears on

11 its facts it doesn't govern in this situation. It seems to me,

12 your Honor, the only issue -- and the issue isn't only whether

13 or not Wilhelmsen really intended to litigate London or New

14 York or someplace else. It seems to me that there's a very

15 real issue here, given the extraordinary nature of the remedy

16 they have sought here, as to whether or not the verified

17 complaint that supported their seeking of the remedy was

18 correct and true.

19 And after they filed it, they verified it, they put

20 those facts before the Court, they got the remedy. I'm here

21 preparing for a hearing that I attacked the complaint and the

22 facts and all these other things and over the weekend I find

23 out the facts in the verified complaint are not the facts. And

24 it seems to me --

THE COURT: Somebody verified this complaint and SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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somebody committed perjury on that date? 1

2 MS. VAN HEMMEN: I'm not saying that. I believe that perhaps there was a change in the mind. I'm not suggesting a 3

fraud or perjury, I'm saying that I believe when you get

remedies of these kind the facts have to be right. And if the

facts shift in a substantive way -- and this is very

substantive, because the basis for coming into Court here to

get this attachment here for stems that occurred in Japan

pursuant to contracts with an entity in Scandinavia and

10 Australia is because the arbitration act said you can do it in

11 furtherance of arbitration. Well, they're not doing it in

furtherance of arbitration, so off the top of my head --12

13 THE COURT: Do we have jurisdiction over the --

14 MS. VAN HEMMEN: At least I would be before you on non-forum argument, and that's one example. I don't know all 15 of other things that --16

17 THE COURT: There could be a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction. 18

MS. VAN HEMMEN: I think there's a motion to vacate 19 20 the attachment on the basis the complaint on which it was based 21 it not true and correct and was --

22 THE COURT: Let's say is no longer true and correct,

23 has become not correct. I mean yeah, I am sitting here, it 24

occurs to me that if the underlying complaint were brought, I

25 think you have to have in personam jurisdiction --

79otwila Argument MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, if I may. 1 2 THE COURT: -- to litigate the underlying complaint. 3 MR. FREVOLA: You do, but the in personam jurisdiction 4 is granted by the attachment which essentially is a form of quasi in rem jurisdiction. And we attached to assets, so you do have jurisdiction up to the amount attached. That's the way 7 the cases --8 Am I right? 9 MS. VAN HEMMEN: No. 10 Your Honor, in rem arrests, which is the same type of jurisdiction where the courts historically -- because of the 11 need for maritime commerce for allowing extensions of jurisdiction, in rem arrests are now routinely dismissed on 13 14 forum. 15 In particular, if you look at all the bunker broker cases, which as you pointed out were all vessel arrests, those 16 cases were willy-nilly being sent away, security was released, 17 18 the court said there was no connection. In those cases the courts were saying the fact that the offending vessel, because 19 20 as you know in the Rule C arrests you have got to get the 21 vessel ---22 THE COURT: The odds that I would keep this case for 23 the underlying dispute are, I would say, slim. 24 MS. VAN HEMMEN: So in any event, your Honor, I would 25 ask for leave to make another motion on that basis. However, I SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C.

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think this is a defect in the procedure from the get go and
warrants dismissal or granting of the motion to vacate on that
the basis alone.

A couple of other points I would like to make very pointedly and I won't taken up a lot of time revisiting the

issues Mr. Frevola addressed. There seems to be some confusion

7 about UBS's position of the significance of the Exxon decision.

8 UBS concedes the Exxon decision says that when somebody who

9 furnishes something to a ship does so through an agent that

10 there is maritime jurisdiction over the contract between the

11 furnisher and the ship owner. I recognize that. And so I am

not here arguing something about commissions or something about

the passage of title is what make the different between Exxonand our case.

My position distinguishing the Exxon case is simply

16 that Exxon made its promises to a ship operator. Wilhelmsen

17 made its promises to UBS, not a ship owner. That's the

18 distinction there. On the other side, your Honor, there are

19 maritime contracts that spring up like the New Filipino case,

20 and like the case that Mr. Frevola just handed up, the Hinkins

21 case, where the providers in fact involved themselves in vessel

22 operations.

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In the case -- the New Filipino case, the person who

24 had contracted with the middle man in fact delivered its

25 services to the ship. Suddenly it's a maritime contract

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because it involves the trafficking of vessels. That's what you have to look at, the nature of the service.

And while in Hinkins on page 2 of the opinion it says something about the entity not having performed all the services themselves because they are husbandry agents, it says on page 1 very specifically incident to furnishing these traditional husbandry services there was repeated attendants on board the ship by Hinkins. You have of got to have that connection to maritime commerce. So the distinction between Exxon is you don't have it with ship. The distinction between Hinkins and the New Filipino case -- excuse me, Exxon, you

don't have the relationship to the ship owner.

When it comes to all these other incidentals, the way
Wilhelmsen maintained its -- the way it got paid, whether it
was a commission or whether it was through arbitrage, whether
or not title passed, this is a myth, this whole passage of
title. We recognize Sumitomo put the marine fuel oil on the

ship and in the one instantaneous point of time the title passed all the way to the U.S. Navy.

The purpose of the Exxon decision in my view is to

The purpose of the Exxon decision in my view is the Supreme Court was telling the District Courts to stop looking at these really irrelevant niceties of the way the contracts were set up, look at the nature of the service that really was provided. So in my view, how Wilhelmsen was paid doesn't matter, what matters is what they did.

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When you come back to the contract, there's no conversation here about what Mr. Frevola believes perhaps occurred prior to the sending of this email. There is no evidence on that, your Honor. Wilhelmsen came into this Court and said this is the contract. This document raises more questions than it answers. So in the Exxon case you had Exxon contracted with the physical supplier and the physical supplier performs, and that was done in furtherance of Exxon's obligation to Waterman. That was very clear.

I contend this document that Wilhelmsen is coming here
and said is the contract is in fact less clear. We don't have
a contract clearly between Wilhelmsen and UBS where Wilhelmsen
says we're going to sell you this stuff and we are going to get
it to the U.S. Navy and then a second contract clearly between
Wilhelmsen and Sumitomo where Sumitomo says we will perform for
you the undertakings you made to UBS.

Instead, it's an odd hybrid that if I were analyzing
this on other bases, your Honor, I could come up with a million
theories. Yes, Mr. Frevola has one interpretation that he
thinks is a clear two-party contract that just has these other
provisions about deliveries.

THE COURT: What's your alternative?

MS. VAN HEMMEN: The alternative is that here the parties -- not only in fact do we know Sumitomo delivered, I think this contract gives rise to a question or an argument

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that Sumitomo was the only one who had the obligation to

deliver. It says they're going to deliver, they incorporated

3 their own terms and conditions relevant to the performance of

that undertaking. I am not sure it's at all clear Wilhelmsen

5 has that obligation.

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I see the other side of it. I know you can say if you sell a product obviously there's an obligation to deliver the product you sold, but this is an unusual document, your Honor.

THE COURT: No, it's a very standard brokers 10 nomination. It says in accordance with the instructions from buyers we confirm -- this is sent to UBS by Wilhelmsen. It 11 says we confirm our verbal order, so obviously there was a 12 telephone call, and we nominate as follows. Nominate in this 13 14 context I have always understood to mean this is how we're going to do it. We confirm our verbal order. 15

MS. VAN HEMMEN: Ours.

17 THE COURT: And we nominate. Nominate means 18 designate. Nominate means designate. And we designate to you 19 this is how we intend to perform our contract with you.

MS. VAN HEMMEN: I think it's equally possible of 20 21 interpreting we confirm our verbal order, the term "our," this is an email from Wilhelmsen where it's calling the order our 22 order, that's correspondence to Sumitomo, your Honor, that they 23 have copied UBS on, is this right, and which is implicit in the 24 25 contract.

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THE COURT: It is sent to two people at UBS, it's not send to anybody at Sumitomo.

MS. VAN HEMMEN: Why is it our? Whose order is it? Buyer's order. Acting in accordance with instructions from you.

THE COURT: We confirm our, yours and mine, our verbal order, the thing that we entered into. Our is me and you.

MS. VAN HEMMEN: In any event, your Honor, this document that they call the contract makes perfectly clear, more so than in the other bunker brokers cases that I have

11 reviewed in connection with this case and others, that is a

12 third party at all times, was intended to perform, and it was

13 Sumitomo. In fact, there's terms and conditions that Sumitomo

14 threw into the pot relevant to their providing that service.

15 That service relates to the trafficking of vessels. The

16 service UBS undertook to the Navy does. What Wilhelmsen did in

17 the middle we contend does not, your Honor.

MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, if I may have one point. If the title shifting was such a myth, Mr. Borge's paragraph 18

20 talks about the fact that UBS has threatened Wilhelmsen with

21 legal action for contaminated bunkers provided to the Bruce

22 C. Heasen (ph) on October 23rd last year, your Honor. And in

23 the first conference we held before your Honor about two weeks

24 ago, UBS reserved their right to seek counter security under

25 Rule E7A for that counterclaim.

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1 THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. FREVOLA: If there was such a myth and there was no contract here where our client or Wilhelmsen was required to perform and to get it right, then why that counterclaim -- they shouldn't have brought that counterclaim.

THE COURT: You're both middle men. This is the irony here. We don't have a ship owner, we don't have the supplier, we have the ship owner's middle man and the oil supplier's middle man here. These are two middle men.

MS. VAN HEMMEN: Your Honor, I would like to point out, we don't deny that there's a contract between UBS and Wilhelmsen, the contract for sale, and that was a mechanism of providing finance. So I felt that Mr. Frevola thought perhaps I was denying a contract existed, I'm not.

THE COURT: No, what he's saying is that your position 15 that this document could be read as a contract between UBS and 16 Sumitomo doesn't work with your argument in paragraph 18 or 17 with the fact that your client has already threatened 18 Wilhelmsen with litigation because it supplied a defective 19 product, a contaminated bunker. And your client did not sue 20 21 Sumitomo for that, it sued the person that -- or it threatened to sue the person that it was looking to for performance of the 22 23 supply agreement.

What's much more interesting to me is whether a contract between two brokers -- not the supplier and not the SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS, P.C. (212) 805-0300

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ship, but two brokers, two intermediaries, which is not exactly the Exxon case -- can be a maritime contract.

MR. FREVOLA: Your Honor, one last thing I was going to say is that we were trying in terms of offering to go forward in New York to try to limit the motion practice before your Honor. If having to amend is going to cause that much of a headache, I guess we'll just deal with the motion when they

8 say that there's no arbitration clause when it comes.

THE COURT: If I were you I would start litigating the underlying merits of this dispute somewhere knowing that you'll

11 be met by a motion.

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16 17 Okay. Well, it's intriguing, I hate not to rule from the bench, but I didn't have all of these cases with me over the weekend, so that means I guess I have to write. Well, I'll need something to do during my jury trial.

Okay. Anything else from either one of you?

MS. VAN HEMMEN: Your Honor, the forum non conveniens

18 claim, I guess that was an issue that would evolve later.

19 THE COURT: Of course it would evolve later. Right

20 now the only claim that is pending before me is a claim for

21 injunction in aid of arbitration. It's a claim for a

22 provisional remedy. It's a claim for an attachment.

MS. VAN HEMMEN: I guess I have, as of this morning,

24 attempted to supplement the basis for my motion to vacate to

25 include a defect arising out of the fact that the factual

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allegations in the amended complaint are no longer true, and so I'm wondering how I should proceed on that.

THE COURT: You shouldn't proceed on that. You have argued it, I hear you, I have to tell you I'm going to reject that argument because they don't know where they're going to litigate it at the present time. And if they smell and they are smelling that it's going to be a problem for them to litigate in New York and they might end up in Australia, they're going to go to London. And then the only thing that would be left for me to decide at some point in the future is whether the arbitration clause in the Sumitomo terms and

whether the arbitration clause in the Sumitomo terms and conditions binds you to arbitrate in London.

You're jumping way ahead of the game with forum non

conveniens. You have no complaint yet that asserts a claim that you could ask me to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. I certainly can't dismiss the claim for the injunction in aid of arbitration on forum non conveniens grounds.

MS. VAN HEMMEN: But in light of the fact that they're not doing it --

THE COURT: He made a statement in a brief that they might do something or they might not do something.

I am rejecting your argument. I have already told you that if in three months they're not litigating somewhere I'm going to vacate the attachment sua sponte.

79otwila Argument MS. VAN HEMMEN: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: I'm not going to keep it going forever if they're not litigating somewhere. I might even move that up to one month. There will not be an attachment without an underlying litigation pending somewhere very soon. Very, very soon. Okay. MR. FREVOLA: Thank you, your Honor. MS. VAN HEMMEN: Thank you, your Honor.